THE TREATY OF LISBON AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT


14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 445 (2008)

Stephen C. Sieberson, Ph.D. in European Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam; J.D., University of Iowa; member of the faculty, Creighton University School of Law.

Editor’s Note: In volume 10 of this journal the editors published an extensive article by the author, entitled “The Proposed European Union  Constitution-Will It Eliminate the EU’s Democratic Deficit? “‘ That article analyzed the first draft of the European Union’s Constitution against a wide array of scholarly comment on the EU’s so-called “democratic deficit. ” When the Union abandoned the Constitution in 2007, the editors invited Professor Sieberson to follow up his earlier article with an analysis of the Constitution’s replacement, the new Treaty of Lisbon. Because this article builds on the previous piece, the full background analysis will not be repeated Rather, the author will draw from his earlier catalogue of factors that comprise the democratic deficit, briefly identifying the primary components of the theory and citing representative sources. For each item he will offer a brief evaluation of whether and how the Lisbon Treaty will affect the deficit.