Volume 17, Issue 2


CASE C-135/08, JANKO ROTTMANN V. FREISTAAT BAYERN

17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 375 (2010) Nathan Cambien, Ph. D.; Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders, Institute for European law, University of Leuven; Visiting Research Fellow, Columbia Law School.


THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ NORMCREATION AND NORM-LIMITING PROCESSES: RESOLVING A NORMATIVE TENSION

17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 307 (2010) Nicolas A.J. Croquet, DPhil in Law, University of Oxford; LL.M., Columbia Law School; M.I.A., Columbia University (SIPA); MJUR, University of Oxford. The ECtHR has resorted to an extra-textual interpretation of the ECHR at three different normative phases of human rights reasoning: definition of scope, review of external limits placed on the exercise of rights not subject to a limitation clause, and review of suspension measures in case of public emergency. Whilst the first phase is characterized by the Court’s over-inclusiveness in the protection of human rights standards, the second and third phases reflect, for the most part, the Court’s under-inclusiveness in the protection of human rights standards. […]


BILATERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN JUDICIAL DESIRE

17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 263 (2010) Sharon Pardo, Jean Monnet, Chair in European Studies at the Department of Politics and Government and the Director of the Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Lior Zemer, Lecturer in Law, Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya and Visiting Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. Transnational economic integration has long been one of the preferred ways in which powerful global players signal their political and economic strength to potential trade partners. A main goal of the European Union in becoming an influential political and economic elite is expanding its transnational relations. The Mediterranean region receives special attention in this process. […]


THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AS A PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 231 (2010) Aurdlian Portuese, University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas. The principle of subsidiarity-whereby a power shared between the European Union and its Member States is exercised at the lowest appropriate level of governance-is a general principle of European Union law the justiciability of which has been widely discussed. The justiciability of the subsidiarity principle has been criticized for underlining its political relevance. However, this critique lacks the power to explain both the weight of the principle of subsidiarity in the E.  U. Treaties and the case law regarding the subsidiarity principle. What is the principle of subsidiarity and what degree of justiciability does it have?


EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL DEMOCRACY: CONTEMPORARY SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 151 (2010) Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Senior Associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP in Washington, D.C., adjunct professor of international law at George Washington University Law School, Member of the Executive Council at the American Society of International Law, fellow at the Truman National Security Project, member of the European Society of International Law, and stylistic editor of the Polish Yearbook of International Law. The European Union, established with the Treaty of Maastricht and expanded through three subsequent treaties, has been granted new powers across extensive policy areas. Most importantly, the consolidation of Qualified Majority Voting (“QMV”) in the Council of Ministers as […]