by Tamas Dezso Ziegler, Balázs Horváthy, Thomas Buijnink
ABSTRACT
This paper elaborates on the role of legal exceptionalism in European integration from the perspective of EU Member States, with special regards to Hungary’s position. Its aim is to prove two points. First, exceptionalism is a natural consequence of increased dependency among European countries. From a legal perspective, this dependency translates into extensive regulatory practices in sensitive fields and increased pooling of sovereignty. Under such circumstances, if states disrespect EU law, they can become renegades, which is a logical consequence of intense cooperation. Second, the EU as a political community can respond to this in two ways. It either informally “allows” breaches of EU law by not effectively stepping up against them or tries to forcefully enforce the relevant provisions. However, harsher measures may result in cancelling cooperation with such Member States. This means that exceptionalism is an ambivalent phenomenon: It is a result of intense cooperation and goes against integration, but paradoxically, it can also be a tool to preserve the legal community of the EU. On the other hand, extensive exceptionalist legislation in a country may undermine the complete cooperation with the given country in the European Union.
Published in CJEL Vol. 30 issue 2.
Read the full article on HeinOnline, Lexis, or Westlaw. Interested in receiving the Columbia Journal of European Law in print at your university or office? Please contact our Executive Editor at ee.cjel@law.columbia.edu.
Also published in Vol. 30 issue 2:
AI Act and the ECB: Steering Financial Supervision in the EU, by Maria Lucia Passador
The Enduring Battle Between the Lex Sportiva and EU Competition Law, by Ilias Bantekas
Dignity and Degrading Treatment at the European Court of Human Rights, by Helen Jennings
