By Dr. Ilias Bantekas
On 9 July 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in ROGON GmbH Co and Others v Deutscher Fußhallbund (DFB).[1] The claim was brought by ROGON, a football consultancy firm against the German Football Association (DFB). The dispute concerned the DFB’s Reglement für Spielervermittlung (Regulations Governing the activities of players’ agents, otherwise known as RfSV), which imposed, among others, a registration/licensing obligation for agents; prohibition of sharing transfer fees between agents and players; fee disclosure and bans on multi-party representation.[2] Despite the fact that the RfSV is only addressed to DFB members, it clearly produces an indirect impact on agents, as third parties. ROGON argued that the RfSV infringed Article 101(1) TFEU in that it allegedly constituted an unlawful restrictive practice against professional agents.[3] It is noteworthy that a week apart from the ROGON judgment the CJEU delivered its preliminary ruling in another case concerning football agents, namely RRC Sports GmbH v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).[4] There, the applicants RRC, a football agency, claimed that the FIFA’s Football Agents’ Regulation (FFAR)[5] and its Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP)[6] infringed Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Court ultimately relied on its slightly earlier judgment in ROGON and addressed the circumstances in which rules adopted by sport governing bodies regulating third parties (football agents) may comply with EU competition law, leaving the application of that framework to the underlying dispute to the referring court.[7]
The last decade has shaken up the relatively calm waters of sport governing bodies (s) operating in the European Union (EU), chiefly through the application of competition rules. In Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission,[8] the CJEU drew a fine line between the principle of sporting autonomy and the need to ensure that SGBs do not operate as monopolies. In this case, the Court recalled that sport is subject to Community law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity.[9] Gainful employment from sport, including also semi-professional activities, falls squarely within the ambit of freedom of movement, freedom to provide services and competition regulation.[10] The CJEU, however, emphasized that rules and policies by SGBs “concerning questions which are of purely sporting interest and, as such, have nothing to do with economic activity” do not fall within the ambit of prohibitions set out by the aforementioned EU legislation on freedom of movement, service provision and competition.[11] The exclusion of these prohibitions (otherwise restrictions) are limited to the “proper objective” of the policy in question and not the entire sporting activity.[12] In the case at hand, the anti-doping rules were found to be compatible with the sporting objective of fairness in sports and the same was true of the attendant penalties because of their legitimate and proportional character.[13]
At some point it was obvious that the autonomy of SGBs would be tested and found in incompatible with the aforementioned EU norms. More recently in International Skating Union v Commission,[14] the CJEU made it clear that while SGBs possess the authority to safeguard the financial and structural integrity of their sporting ecosystem, eligibility rules that effectively inhibit the creation of alternative competitions and prevent athletes from making livelihood choices violate article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
There are several inter-related themes arising in the ROGON judgment. Firstly, the structural autonomy of SGBs from state authorities and the restriction on the latter to regulate the sports-related affairs of SGBs. As a result, the various rules and regulations adopted by SGBs are binding on all those operating in their particular ecosystem (i.e. national federations, clubs, athletes and coaches) by reason of contract. The ROGON judgment stretches this contractual bond to entities outside of this sui generis contract (i.e. the vertical applicability and bindingness of SGB rules and regulations). Although the CJEU does not seem to approach the claims in ROGON through a contractual lens, it no doubt accepts this proposition from the outset. The key claim could thus be summarized as follows: should third parties (football agents) to rules and regulations of SGBs be bound by them without their consent, particularly where these rules purport to restrict their economic freedom? This claim straddles between contracts and the law of competition. Professional agents have long maintained that they are third parties to sporting ecosystems and that they are not bound by SGB rules and regulations. This is not, however, entirely true. Several SGBs, including FIFA, require that in order for a transfer to be cleared and the transfer certificate issued, details of all fees paid need to be disclosed, including agent fees. In equal measure, SGBs have an interest to ensure that professional agents do not take advantage of their members (i.e. players) particularly those without access to counsel, minors in a vulnerable situation and others. Players in such circumstances have in the past been tied unduly long agency contracts or promised lucrative transfers in breach of existing contractual obligations. The integrity of a sports ecosystem is necessarily dependent on the actions of its functioning regulator, which is the responsible SGB. Agents cannot and will not undertake this role because it is not in their interests and may even be antithetical to their narrow interests. As a matter of contract law, third parties become parties to a contract where they accept the rights and obligations conferred upon them. Agents’ professional activity constitutes a tacit approval of FFAR and RSTP.
The CJEU confirmed the distinction between sports-related SGB rules and those that were not so related (to which EU law was fully applicable). In line with its rationale in Meca-Medina, the Court emphasized that SGB rules on agents may fall outside the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU only if the rules in question are found to be necessary to preserve the fair and ethical operation of the sport’s overall integrity and regulation. The CJEU clarified that rules and regulations adopted by SGBs may satisfy the conditions set out in Meca-Medina, despite the fact that they pursue commercial objectives, as long as they simultaneously pursue objectives in the sphere of the broader public interest. An assessment as to whether this is actually the case in any particular context should be performed in respect of groups of provisions pursuing a distinct objective or producing a distinct effect as well, rather than through a blanket assessment of the regulation as a whole. The CJEU set out the framework for determining whether the regulations fall within Article 101(1) TFEU and whether the exception recognized in its case law may apply, while leaving the test to be applied by the court of referral. Particularly, the Court held that the exception is capable of applying only where the regulations cannot be classified as restricting competition by object and pursue one or more legitimate objectives in the public interest in a necessary and proportionate manner.
Given the latitude inherent in the principle of autonomy, ultimately it is not in the interests of agents or FIFA – and other SGBs more generally – to battle these issues in lengthy litigation. Common solutions that cater for the integrity and fairness of sport can and should be found through dialogue.
[1] ROGON GmbH Co and Others v Deutscher Fußhallbund (DFB), ECLI:EU:C:2026:563, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0428.
[2] Id, ROGON judgment, para 8.
[3] Id, paras 1-2 and 10.
[4] RRC Sports GmbH v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62023CJ0209
[5] FIFA’s latest (2025) Agent Regulations are available at: https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/1e7b741fa0fae779/original/FIFA-Football-Agent-Regulations.pdf
[6] The latest version of the RSTP is available at: https://digitalhub.fifa.com/asset/e495d04b-ef95-4d07-ace2-ea4d7781d7de/Regulations-on-the-Status-and-Transfer-of-Players_January-2027.pdf
[7] RRC judgment, supra note 4 para 40.
[8] Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62004CJ0519.
[9] Id, para 22.
[10] Id, para 23.
[11] Id, paras 25-26.
[12] Id, paras 26-27.
[13] Id, paras 42-48.
[14] International Skating Union v Commission, Case C-124/21 P, EU:C:2023:1012, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62021CJ0124.
