by: Dora Kostakopoulou*
Migration is a critical policy issue on a global scale. The number of international migrants and refugees worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in the 21st century while the decline in growth in working age population in the developed world ranges from moderate to severe in various countries. Environmental degradation and climate change are bound to induce large scale displacements of people in the near future as well as to expose the general lack of preparedness and deficiencies in policy in European Union countries and elsewhere. Yet, politicians are still attracted to the zero-migration myth and to restrictive migration policies believing that they reflect conservative trends in public opinion and rightly respond to citizens’ concerns. In reality, however, they do the opposite. By being unable to realize in praxis their proclaimed zero or reduced “migration targets,” politicians create larger gaps between citizens’ expectations and state action thereby undermining public trust in institutions and the government. Another myth advanced by national executives has been that restrictions on entries of newcomers are a prerequisite for liberalizing the conditions of residence of the long-term resident migrants and of naturalization. In reality, however, there is an alignment between migration and integration policies and anti-migrant public rhetoric and policies negatively impact the life-worlds of settled third country residents and citizens of minority communities.
The number of third country nationals, that is, non-EU citizens (TCNs, thereafter), in the European Union, has increased significantly in the new millennium. From 12 million people in the mid-1990s, there are 23.8 million resident non-EU citizens in 2023. This represents 5.3% of the total EU population of 446.7 million people. At the end of 2022 more than 12 million of them had long-term residence permits. Their status is regulated by the long-term residents Directive 2003/109/EC, which provides security of status and residence but does not include free movement rights and electoral rights. Interestingly, despite the fact that all long-term third country nationals pay taxes and social insurance contributions and have made the host country the main hub of their personal and professional lives, only fourteen EU Member States (MS, thereafter) have granted municipal voting rights to non-national residents. And even those Member States that enable migrant voting at local and/or regional level do not hesitate to impose conditions be they residence-related and/or registration requirements or reciprocity.
*Visiting Professor of European Union Law, European Integration and Public Policy at KU Leuven University and former Chair of the Scientific Committee of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU (June 2020 – June 2023).
Published in CJEL Vol. 29 issue 3.
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Also published in Vol. 29 issue 3:
Good Administration in AI-Enhanced Banking Supervision: A Risk-Based Approach, by Alessio Azzutti, Pedro M. Batista, Wolf-Georg Ringe
EU Emergency – Call 122? On the Possibilities And Limits of Using Article 122 TFEU to Respond to Situations Of Crisis, by Daniel Calleja, Tim Maxian Rusche, Trajan Shipley
