Helen Jennings*
ABSTRACT
This paper examines a development in recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court,” “ECtHR”) regarding the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“Article 3,” “ECHR”). Since the 2010s, the Court has linked the prohibition of degrading treatment uniquely with the concept of human dignity.1 In cases regarding certain applicant groups, in particular women from the Roma population and LGBT+ people, the Court has used the concept of human dignity to radically expand the typical boundaries of protection offered under Article 3.
This paper explores how the Court is using human dignity to modify its approach in relation to Article 3 ECHR, and considers why the Court has extended protection against degrading treatment in these unique contexts. I speculate on how the Court is defining human dignity in these cases. I argue that the Court’s sensitivity to the interaction of human dignity, vulnerability and degrading treatment could have significant consequences if embraced by the Court as part of their pursuit of the Convention’s dignitarian ideals, but that the definitions of both human dignity and vulnerability should be tightly constrained to preserve the integrity of Article 3 as an absolute right.
*Doctor of Juridical Science (JSD) Candidate, University of California Berkeley School of Law.
Published in CJEL Vol. 30 issue 2.
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Also published in Vol. 30 issue 2:
AI Act and the ECB: Steering Financial Supervision in the EU, by Maria Lucia Passador
Exceptionalism in European Union Law: A Community for Outsiders?, by Tamas Dezso Ziegler, Balázs Horváthy, & Thomas Buijnink
The Enduring Battle Between the Lex Sportiva and EU Competition Law, by Ilias Bantekas
